Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 7
Number 4 Volume 7, No. 4, Special Issue
Winter 2014: Future Challenges in Drone
Geopolitics

Article 6

Help Wanted: American Drone Program Needs Multifaceted
Support to be Effective
S. Hall
Bellevue University, hsm8857@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 57-80
Recommended Citation

Hall, S.. "Help Wanted: American Drone Program Needs Multifaceted
Support to be Effective." Journal of Strategic Security 7, no. 4 (2014) :
57-80.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.4.5
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss4/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Help Wanted: American Drone Program Needs Multifaceted
Support to be Effective
Abstract
The U.S. drone program in Pakistan faces strong resistance in Pakistan. Because the
program solely seeks to eliminate terrorist groups and leaders through bombing
campaigns, with no built in social support, the local population’s anti-American sentiment
has reached the highest level in history. This angry mood against U.S. drone programs is
spreading throughout the Islamic world. To counter this anti-American sentiment, and
increase the drone program’s effectiveness, the U.S. must invest in multifaceted, socioeconomic support efforts to educate the population and rebuild the gratuity, trust, and
commitment of Pakistan’s people to the “War on Terror.”
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Introduction
With the current situations in Iraq and Syria, air strikes and bombing campaigns
are a popular solution for the U.S. military to hinder terrorist groups such as the
Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL) that threaten the Middle East. Drone
programs are touted by political heavyweights such as President Obama and U.S.
Rear Admiral John Kirby (Pentagon Press Secretary) as the best way to monitor
terrorist groups, assess their growing threat, and weaken their positions without
ever threatening an American life. This is because the drones can be flown from
pilots safely ensconced thousands of miles away on their U.S. military base.
Unfortunately, we know from a decade of drone campaigns in Pakistan, Yemen,
and Afghanistan that the air campaign must be a beginning step in a more
extensive nation-building plan supplemented by rebuilding efforts because aironly campaigns cannot address cultural and systemic issues that raise antiAmerican sentiments and contribute to terrorist cell recruitment.
Drone technology has allowed more accurate targeting of individuals, better
reconnaissance collection, and protected troops; Drones have also killed innocent
civilians, destroyed villages, raised levels of anti-American sentiment while
failing to reduce terrorism in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Yemen. Despite a decade of drone campaigns to counter anti-American efforts,
the hostility against the United States in these areas has increased and groups
such as ISIL have emerged. This has to raise the question, “do air-only campaigns
really work to combat terrorism?” The answer is no and it can be demonstrated
by analyzing the weaknesses of the U.S. drone program in Pakistan. For the last
decade, the United States has engaged in a drone campaign in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to combat terrorist groups that pepper the
region. Despite the deaths of terrorist leaders and years of destruction, terrorism
is still a pervasive problem in Pakistan and anti-American sentiment is at an alltime high. This article attempts to highlight the shortcomings of the U.S. policy
around the drone program in Pakistan and ways in which drone programs could
be strengthened with socio-economic programs to address systemic problems in
the country. These supplemental programs should mitigate resentment and
hostility against the United States before it is permanently engrained in the
population.

Brief History of the Insurgents and United States-Pakistan Relations
The United States has always had a volatile relationship with Pakistan. In the
1950s-1970s, Pakistan was part of the containment effort to stop the spread of the
Soviet Union. In the 1970s the United States equipped and supported Pakistani
mujahedin fighters along the border who fought against the Soviet Union
occupation of Afghanistan. This eventually helped to force Russia’s withdrawal
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from Afghanistan. No longer useful and radically religious, these former U.S.sponsored, mujahedin fighters became well-armed guerrilla groups that spawned
Islamist jihadists, the Taliban, and al-Qaida in the border area between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This territory is the FATA today.1
After Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, the United States imposed
sanctions. Despite this, Pakistan has maintained a working relationship with the
United States since the 1950s. The incentive for Pakistan was more than $73
billion in military aid from the United States and their partners (World Bank’s
International Development Association, Japan, United Kingdom, European
Union, Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and others).2
After the September 11th attacks in 2001, Pakistan became an integral partner to
the United States in the “War on Terror”; Pakistan was motivated to participate
in the “War on Terror” because they experienced a surge in Taliban-led violence
in the FATA. A rejuvenated Pashtun Taliban, funded by drug operations and
foreign investors, had gained popularity in the FATA by promising the economic
recovery, improvement to infrastructure, and social services that the government
had failed to provide despite all of the foreign aid money. Then-President
Musharraf realized that despite different motives from the United States,
something had to be done to combat the Taliban from gaining a foothold in
Pakistan. He realized that the Taliban, an Afghan-bred organization, was
bleeding over the border and finding support in Pakistan.3 Musharraf agreed to
work with the United States to stop the Taliban’s encroachment and began
working with tribal leaders to counter Taliban’s efforts in the FATA. When the
United States asked to base drone and intelligence operations out of Pakistan to
hunt down al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Usama bin Ladin using Pakistani runways,
his government was willing to work with them.4
Pakistan allowed the CIA and the United States military to operate drone
programs out of secret airbases, move supplies through North Pakistan to
support military efforts in Afghanistan, and use the Pakistani military for combat
operations against Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. In exchange, they asked for
more aid, military training, and arms as they sought to keep control of the
1 Richard Friedman, Frank Schell and Lauren Bean, "American Foreign Policy Towards
Pakistan," National Strategy Forum Review: Strategic Challenges Near and Far (Fall
2009), available at:
http://nationalstrategy.com/NSFReview/Fall2009Vol18Issue3USMexico/PakistanSpec
ialReport.aspx.
2 Ibid.
3 Qasim Ilyas, "President Musharraf Interview with Charlie Rose Part 1," YouTube.com,
January 24, 2007, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t4lQ-_jwt8o.
4 Johnston, Patrick, Anoop Sarbahi, Stanford University, and Rand Corporation. The
Impact of US Drone Strkes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Stanford:
Stanford University, 2014).
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country and secure their nuclear weapons.5 Pakistan agreed to work with the
United States to target individuals suspected of militant activities and allow the
United States government to use surveillance drones to help them target the
insurgents in the FATA areas.
As a result of its cooperation, Pakistan has received more than $20 billion in U.S.
aid since 2001.6 The aid is primarily military funding because after the September
11th attacks, the United States needed the support of the government to run its
operations, not the hearts of the people. The United States continues to be
Pakistan’s largest source of military and nonmilitary aid. Unfortunately, much of
the aid money was used to line government and military coffers and did not make
it to the impoverished village populations.
To try to address issue of misapplied aid money, in 2009, the U.S. Congress
passed the Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act (commonly known as the
Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, or KBL). KBL was designed to separate the military
efforts from the development agenda, thus facilitating longer-term planning and
investment for Pakistan’s people. KBL authorized an investment of more than
$7.5 billion in Pakistan’s development for fiscal years 2010 to 2014. The funding
was to be distributed by several federal aid agencies. Distribution of the funds ran
into trouble as limited capacity of local partners, concerns about corruption and
security, lack of systematic reforms, and deferred aid after natural disasters,
made getting money to the correct destination difficult.7 This was in part because
the United States had not invested in developing a loyal contingency of local
leaders in Pakistan. After years of corruption, misuse of U.S. aid dollars, ejection
of the United States military trainers, and the national government’s cooperation
with insurgent groups, the United States made the decision in 2011 to begin
reducing the aid package by freezing nonmilitary aid efforts at the current levels,
and cutting Pakistan’s military aid by approximately $800 million.8 Pakistan is
still the fourth largest recipient of the United States economic and military aid
after Israel, Afghanistan, and Egypt.9

Drones on a Global Scale
Friedman, Schell, and Bean. "American Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan."
Ibid.
7Staff, “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers,” Center for Global Development, June 01, 2014,
available at: http://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers.
8 Colin Cookman, Brian Katulis, Sarah Margon, and Caroline Wadmhams. “The Limits of
U.S Assistance to Pakistan,” Center for American Progress (July 18, 2011), available at:
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2011/07/18/10007/thelimits-of-u-s-assistance-to-pakistan/.
9 Staff, “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers."
5

6
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Unmanned drones were initially used as a reconnaissance tool to gather data
about the terrain, locate hostile combatants, and other geospatial uses. They were
first used by the U.S. military in Kosovo and Bosnia but are now widely deployed
around the world by at least eighty-seven governments.10 Saudi Arabia, the U.K.,
and Israel, all have drone programs of their own.11 Drones are considered an
invaluable resource because they can silently hover and watch individuals,
groups, or locations for hours without putting a human pilot at risk.
Advancements in technology made it possible to make drones larger to carry and
launch Predator and Hellfire missiles at combatants. This makes armed air
campaigns possible without risking a pilot’s life in the process.

U.S. Drone Programs in Pakistan
Under President George W. Bush, the United States began fighting the “War on
Terror” in Pakistan’s FATA region using drone surveillance and missile strikes.
Through an agreement with Pakistan’s government and military, the CIA
launched hundreds of attacks in Northwest Pakistan to flush out Taliban and alQaida guerilla training camps and forces, which were supported by (and
suspected to have been hiding) Usama bin Ladin—the United States’ number one
target for his role in the September 11th attacks.12
The U.S. military and CIA designed their drone programs to target terrorist
organizations and insurgent groups in territories that the United States and allies
cannot or will not engage in a traditional ground campaign. Pakistan is one of
these territories because of mountainous terrain, limited ground intelligence
collection programs, and hostile local populations that threaten the U.S. military
with a long, convoluted ground campaign. Additionally, Pakistan is generally
deemed as a friendly government to the U.S. and therefore we would not invade
an ally’s sovereign territory without their request for help. The U.S. drone
program in Pakistan was built with its government’s approval and seeks to deter
terrorists and insurgent organizations by killing and creating fear and uncertainty
in the insurgent leadership, while minimizing the risk to U.S. military troop.
However, drones also cause dread and chaos for civilian populations. After more
than a decade of reconnaissance and hellfire missiles rained down from drones,
the Pakistani people are pushing back against the American-led programs to clear
the Taliban and insurgents out of FATA. In Pakistan, anti-American sentiment is
at an all-time high.
Guy Taylor, “U.S. Intelligence Warily Watches for Threats to U.S. Now That 87 Nations
Possess Drones,” The Washington Times, November 10, 2013.
11 Akbar Nasir Khan, “US Policy of Targeted Killing by Drones,” IPRI Journal 11:1 (Winter
2011): 21-40, available at:
http://www.academia.edu/225132/US_Policy_of_Targeted_Killing_by_Drones_in_P
akistan.
12 Ibid.
10
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Individuals such as Leah Bolger, the president of Veterans for Peace, have
pointed to this wave of anger against America as evidence that drone programs
are creating more terrorists than they are terminating. Bolger claims that this is
because the drones themselves terrorize a population and build resistance to U.S.
policy and programs.13 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Malala Yousafzai, has also
spoken out against U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, saying to President Obama
“Drone attacks are fueling terrorism. Innocent victims are killed in these acts and
they lead to resentment among the Pakistani people.”14 Resistance to the United
States in Pakistan is not new but blaming terrorism on drones oversimplifies the
regional and global conflicts that affect the global Islamic-Arab community and
contribute to terrorism. Pakistanis generally relate more closely to Islamic-Arab
countries rather than their Hindu and Asian neighbors. Thus, some of the conflict
engulfing much of the Islamic-Arab world bleeds into Pakistan. This article will
not address these conflicts individually, as they would each be extensive
discussions in themselves, but the reader should take into consideration global
Islamic-Arab attitudes towards U.S. military campaigns in Iraq, recent conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iran, U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
its alliance with Saudi Arabia. The drone program does not operate in a bubble
and as such, outside global influences also contribute to Pakistan’s anti-American
opinion. This article only considers the U.S. drone program in Pakistan’s
contribution to these opinions and how the program can be supported to improve
its success against terrorism.

Growing Anti-American Sentiment
While successful at disrupting the Taliban and al-Qaida activities, cracks began to
appear in the partnership with Pakistan as early as 2005. Though drone strikes
pose much less risk to civilian casualties and are much more accurate in their
targeting abilities than previous bombing campaigns, the drone efforts
inadvertently killed many Pakistani civilians, including women and children. The
debate remains if this is a failure in intelligence communities to accurately screen
and identify actual terrorist activities and members, or if the casualties are simply
a wartime result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, with known
terrorists. One of the main weaknesses of air-only campaigns is that it is hard to
identify gatherings and individual movements without individuals on the ground
gathering information from local leaders and civilians. As retired Air Force Lt.
Gen. Ralph Jodice discusses, without on-the-ground forces, it is difficult to tell
Staff, "Drone attacks 'create more enemies with every innocent person killed," Rueters,
November 19, 2013 Retrieved October 10, 2014, available at: http://rt.com/op-edge/usdrone-attacks-killings-953/.
14 CNN Political Unit, "Malala to Obama: Drone strikes 'fueling terrorism'," CNN.com,
October 12, 2013, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/12/politics/obamas-meetmalalas/.

13
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“friend or foe.” This is because non-state actors are widely dispersed and do not
use conventional tactics or equipment. They are fighting from trucks with
makeshift weaponry and no uniforms. “Its pickup truck versus pickup truck and
they’re wearing the same clothes. They’re not flying flags or wearing insignias.”15
Therefore identifying a caravan of vehicles heading to a wedding versus a caravan
of fighters from the air is incredibly difficult without intelligence from the
ground. The decimation of families, civilians, and innocent children through
drone strikes has led to major pushback by tribes and local villages against the
drone efforts. By 2010, Pakistanis were so upset with the United States’ policy
that bin Laden had higher approval ratings than either President Bush in
Pakistan. Many Pakistanis continue to feel their opinion of the United States
would improve drastically if the United States ceased their drone programs.16
To monitor the public Pakistani sentiment, Pew Research Center conducted
several studies since to track the mood of the Pakistani population towards the
United States. In 2005, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey that
revealed fifty-one percent of Pakistanis supported bin Laden and only twentyseven percent of Pakistanis supported using their army to fight Taliban and alQaida militant groups in the FATA.17 In 2008, this had shifted so that twenty-four
percent of Pakistanis still supported bin Laden and thirty-eight percent of
Pakistanis supported their Army confronting the Taliban and guerilla groups.
After nearly a decade of drone programs, in 2010, a Pew Research Center survey
showed fifty-nine percent of Pakistanis described the United States as an enemy.
A mere eleven percent saw the United States as a partner in the battle against
terrorism, and just seventeen percent of Pakistanis had a favorable view at all of
the United States. Eight percent believed that President Obama would do the
right thing in the world. This was lower than bin Laden’s approval level ever fell.
Sixty-four percent thought that it was important for relations with the United
States to improve.18
A follow up survey, two years later in 2012, showed that Pakistani discontent with
the United States policy had grown. Roughly seventy-four percent of Pakistanis
considered the United States an enemy. President Obama’s ratings were no better
than the 2010 survey suggested. Only forty-five percent still said it was important
to improve relations with the United States. A mere seventeen percent backed

Kristina Wong, "Syria strikes need on-the-ground intel, say defense experts," The Hill,
September 10, 2014, available at: http://thehill.com/policy/defense/217328-syriastrikes-needs-on-the-ground-intel-say-experts.
16 Pew Research, “Pakistanis See US as an Enemy,” Pew Research Center, August 12,
2010, available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/pakistanis-see-u-s-asan-enemy/.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
15
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American drone strikes against leaders of extremist groups.19 The 2013 another
Pew Research Study, revealed only slightly better opinions of the United States.
Approximately sixty-four percent of Pakistanis now see the United States as more
of an enemy than a partner. To compound this issue, the percentage of Pakistanis
who think having better relationships with the United States is important has
also declined in recent years. Extremist groups remain unpopular; the percentage
of people who believe the Taliban is a very serious threat is up from thirty-seven
percent in 2012 to forty-nine percent in 2013. Albeit this concern, the majority of
the population does not think that the U.S. drone program is actually combating
terrorism. Roughly sixty-eight percent oppose the drone strikes and only a third
of the respondents believe the drone strikes are necessary to defend Pakistan
from extremist groups. The majority of respondents, (seventy-four percent),
believe that the drones kill too many innocent people. This opposition to the
drones has lowered the positive view of the United States by Pakistanis to a level
lower than it was throughout much of President George W. Bush’s
administration.20 Pakistanis do not like the threat of the Taliban nor al-Qaida
stemming from Afghanistan, but they also object to the United States conducting
operations in their area, which has impacted their daily lives, destroyed families,
and killed innocents for more than a decade. These deaths create grievances
against the United States and Pakistan authorities that resonate across the
country.
In 2010 The New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow conducted a
survey of face-to-face interviews of FATA residents ages 18 years or older across
120 villages. Nearly nine out of ten people in FATA opposed the U.S. military
pursuing al-Qaida and the Taliban in their region. Nearly seventy-percent of
FATA residents felt the Pakistani government should tackle the problem without
the help of the U.S. government. More than seventy-five percent of FATA
residents directly opposed the strikes and only sixteen-percent of respondents
think that the strikes accurately target insurgents. Many hold the United States
partially responsible for the increase of terrorist activities in their areas. This
unfavorable view of the drone program does not mean the population supports
al-Qaida nor the Taliban. More than three-quarters of FATA residents oppose the
presence of either group in their region and would not support them on political
ballots. Like the Pew Research Studies, many respondents claim that their

Pew Research, “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of US,” Pew Research
Center, June 27, 2012, available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27/pakistanipublic-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/.
20 Pew Research, “On the Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” Pew
Research Center, May 7, 2013, available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/oneve-of-elections-a-dismal-public-mood-in-pakistan/.
19
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opinion of the United State would improve dramatically if the United States
ceased their drone programs in their area.21
In 2013 protests of the drone program shut down U.S. and NATO supply routes
across Northern Pakistan.22 These supply routes not only supplied the efforts of
the drone program, but it also supplied the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan
through passes in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. When the
Pakistanis blocked the roads, it paralyzed drawdown efforts to get equipment and
troops out of Afghanistan. The United States and NATO halted the removal of
equipment from Afghanistan through Pakistan at the end of 2013. These
roadblocks resulted in millions of dollars of American equipment being
temporarily stuck in Afghanistan as troops withdrew.23
Hostility against the drone program ensued, as the population demanded its
government cease the program and change their domestic security policies. In an
effort to appease protesters, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called for a pause in
the drone program at the end of 2013 as peace negotiations with the Pakistan
Taliban began.24 These peace talks proved unfruitful and in June 2014 Prime
Minister Sharif announced a full-scale operation to flush out Taliban in the
FATA. This is the first solo operation Pakistan has initiated in the region and they
have requested help from the Afghan National Army to secure border regions.
There are mixed views by civilians as to whether or not the Pakistani military can
tackle the Taliban and terrorists on their factions of its own civil government is
suspected to have given aid to the insurgents in the past.25 The campaign is also
seen as a military effort to drag the civilian government into the fight against the
Taliban, which is creating a larger divide between civilian and military efforts.
The program will not address plans to rehabilitate any internally displace
persons. The civilian government has not made any budget allocations to achieve

Peter Bergen, Patrick Doherty, and Ballen Ken, “Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal
Regions,” New American Foundation (March 25, 2014).
22 Zulfiqar Ali, “The United States Halts Truck Shipments through Pakistan Amid Antidrone Protests,” L.A. Times, December 04, 2013, available at:
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/04/world/la-fg-wn-pakistan-afghanistan-natotruck-blockade-20131204.
23 Phil Stewart, “US Stops Cargo Shipments on Afghanistan-Pakistan Land Route, Citing
Fears about Protests,” December 03, 2013, available at:
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/us-stops-cargo-shipments-afghanistanpakistan-land-route-citing-fears-f2D11691906.
24 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistani PM Urges Stop to US Drone Strikes,” Voice of America, October
22, 2013, available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/us-accused-of-unlawfulkillings-pakistan-drone-strikes/1774276.html.
25 Kamal Siddiqi, "Our own enemies," Tribune.com, December 2, 2012, available at:
http://tribune.com.pk/story/474166/our-own-enemies/.
21
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goals laid out in national security policy that makes efforts to stop the Taliban
unlikely to be successful.26

Weaknesses of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan
Terrorism and insurgents arise through complex situations that can involve
socio-economics, religion, politics, failed states, fear, and other hybrids of issues.
The drone program only seeks to disrupt insurgents’ organization and
communication by destroying insurgent forces, logistical facilities, transport
assets, leadership targets, communication systems, and key chokepoints (such as
bridges and overpasses). The program feeds civilian anxiety with no social
support to mitigate emotional outrage. Their populations only see the destruction
of their homes and deaths of their family members that the drones bring, which
according to analysts such as Bolger, this causes them to fight harder against the
attackers and join forces such as the Taliban. However, research shows that
drones cannot be proven to directly increase nor decrease terror organizations’
recruitment levels.
The United States continues to use drones because according to intelligence,
statistically collected data, and the policy makers, the drones are effective at
disrupting militant and terror groups’ organizations, making it harder for them to
implement large acts of violence. Then-Senator John Kerry claimed in 2009 that
it had eliminated fourteen of the top twenty terrorists through this program. The
Obama Administration claims the drones have eliminated twenty of al-Qaida’s
top thirty leaders from 2009 to 2012. The New America Foundation claims that
the strikes have killed twenty-eight senior al-Qaida leaders, and more than fiftyone militants from 2004 to 2013.27
In a recent address to the 2014 graduating class of West Point, President Obama
outlined the framework for foreign policy. Regarding the drones, he said “the
United States will continue to take direct action using drone strikes when
necessary to protect ourselves but that a drone strike should only occur when
there is “a near certainty” that no civilians will be harmed.”28 The United States
has not conducted a drone strike in Pakistan since December 2013.29 This is the

26 Mateen Haider, "NW Operation to continue until terrorism is eliminated," Dawn.com,
June 17, 2014, available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1113129.
27 Bergen, Doherty and Ken, “Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal Regions."
28 " Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement
Ceremony,” Office of the Press Secretary, the White House May 28, 2014, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-unitedstates-military-academy-commencement-ceremony
29 It is suspected, but not proven, that the U.S. drone strikes have been reactivated in
Pakistan as of October 2014; Zahir Shah Sherazi and Jason Hanna, "Drone strikes kill 8
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, sources Say," CNN.com, October 11, 2014, available at:

65
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 4

longest pause in the program. President Obama also restated in the speech, his
desire to move the drone program from the CIA to the military to improve
transparency. The U.S. Congress opposes this move.30
The United States defends its drone campaigns by reminding international
audiences that it is at war with these terror organizations and, under
international war standards, it is able to target individuals plotting to do harm
against the United States or its citizens. Arguments can be made for and against
the success of the United States drone programs. According to a 2013 report for
the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and Army War College by James Walsh, three
conflicting academic reports have surfaced regarding the drone’s effectiveness in
Pakistan. One study claims that the drones reduce the number and severity of
terrorist attacks in the FATA territories. Another finds that drone strikes are
associated with more, not less, acts of terrorism as retaliation for the drone
strikes. Finally, the third finds that civilian deaths have no consistent
relationships with terrorism in Pakistan.31
Because of these conflicting academic reports, Patrick Johnston and Rand
Corporation released study called The Impact of the U.S. Drone Strikes on
Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2014. This study looked at direct
correlations between the drone strikes and terrorist activities using empirical
research methods. The results support the theory that the U.S. programs have
succeeded in curbing deadly attacks within the targeted territory in Pakistan. The
study shows that drone strikes are generally associated with a reduced rate of
terrorist attacks, reduction of number of people killed as a result of terrorist
attacks, and decreases in lethal or intimidating attacks (such as IEDs or suicide
attacks). However, it also states that this does not suggest that groups are
dispersing or leaving the territories being hit by drones.32 The empirical evidence
also cannot collaborate the claims that the drone programs have increased terror
organizations’ recruitment numbers, as there is no concrete way to measure the
changes of levels in terrorist enlistment.
While directly linking drone strikes to terrorist recruitment is difficult, arguing
that anti-American sentiment by civilians in Pakistan has increased because of
the drone program is not hard. More than a decade of Pew Research studies and
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/11/world/asia/pakistan-afghanistan-dronestrikes/index.html.
30 “Obama: US Will Still Use Drone Strikes.”
31 James Igoe Walsh, "The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and
Counterterrorism Campaigns," Strategic Studies Institute and Army War College Press,
September 2013, available at:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1167.pdf.
32 Johnston, Sarbahi, Stanford University, and Rand Corporation. The Impact of US
Drone Strkes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
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the New American Foundation surveys, prove that the general opinion of
Pakistan’s population is directly related to the drone program. Respondents also
claimed that limiting or ceasing the drone programs could easily reverse the
negative opinion. However, ceasing the programs entirely could lead to increased
terrorist activity, as groups will be able to reorganize and launch retaliatory
attacks. Ending the programs would not address the full problem. The antiAmerican sentiment could be mitigated by giving the civilian population
alternative ways to be prosperous, productive, and safe, while continuing
President Obama’s 2013 initiative to ensure that the individuals targeted by the
drones are truly connected to insurgent or terrorist groups.
One big flaw in the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is that it fails to negate
terrorist abilities and recruitment because is not a well-rounded plan. Bombing
campaigns and air assaults should be one part of a synergistic nation-building
effort because they can disrupt insurgent operations by taking out the key
facilities mentioned above. Air campaigns alone do not address systemic culture
or economic issues that cause local populations to side with terrorist
organizations. Drones should be part of a long-term commitment to rehabilitate a
country, monitor progress, and disrupt insurgent activities but on its own will
never be effective in ending terrorism. Even President Obama observed in an
interview that military intervention not backed by a major effort to build a
functional state afterwards would simply lead to chaos and a new set of threats to
American interests.33 Unfortunately, he has not applied systems to address his
own observation in countries with drone programs such as Pakistan.

Reaction to U.S. Drone Programs in Yemen and Elsewhere
The Pakistanis people’s cries of outrage are echoed in Yemen, where a similar
drone campaign has been ongoing since 2002. Beginning shortly after the
September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush worked with the Yemeni
government to fight insurgents in Yemen using drones. Initially the Yemeni
government took credit for the drones. However, evidence of U.S. missiles was
discovered in the wreckage of drone strikes. An outcry emanated from the public
and the Yemeni government admitted that the CIA backed their efforts. In
Yemen, it is estimated that there have been more than 108 drone strikes, with the
vast majority of those happening since 2010. As in Pakistan, the strikes in Yemen
have been a collaborated effort between the CIA and the U.S. military, and the
Yemeni military and government. Estimates put the death toll at more than 900
people. Approximately one-third of those were civilian casualties. The United

33 K.M. Pollack, "Assessing the Obama Administration's Iraq-Syria Strategy," Brookings
Institute, September 26, 2014, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-atsaban/posts/2014/09/26-pollack-assessing-obama-administration-iraq-syriastrategy.
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States claims to have killed at least thirty-five key al-Qaida leaders including
Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni born Imam who moved to the United States and
became a naturalized citizen. Awlaki later radicalized against the United States in
events after September 11th bombings. He is believed to have aided al-Qaida. He
and his son were two of the few U.S. citizens targeted by the drone programs. The
drones are also believed to have eliminated Fahd al-Quso, who was suspected of
involvement in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.34
On December 12th, 2013, a drone strike hit a large wedding party’s caravan.
Between eleven to fifteen individuals were killed. It was later revealed that the
U.S. and Yemeni governments thought they were targeting an insurgent’s convoy
but had killed innocent civilians instead.35 Anger against the drone program hit
an all-time high. Yemeni officials begin to voice apprehension and doubt of the
joint program. Cries that the strikes violate Yemeni’s sovereignty were loud but
hard to prove since the Yemeni government and military actively involved in the
planning and targeting of the strikes, and condoned the programs since
inception. Nabeel Khoury, the deputy chief of mission in Yemen from 2004 to
2007, stated,
“Drone strikes take out a few bad guys to be sure, but they also kill a large
number of innocent civilians. Given Yemen’s tribal structure, the United
States generates roughly forty to sixty new enemies for every AQAP [alQaida in the Arabian Peninsula] operative killed by drones.”36
Despite increased numbers of drone strikes, and rising civilian casualties, alQaida’s activities in Yemen steadily increased. This led to concerns of the
program’s effectiveness. Local political analysts and tribal leaders claim that, in
the provinces where the drone strikes occur most often, many civilians radicalize
against the United States and this has spawned an increase in terrorist activity
and recruitment into al-Qaida. Yemen officials have called for more limited, and
specific targeting.37 The program was paused from December 2013 through
March of 2014. Strikes have since resumed at a slower pace.

“Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis,” New America Foundation, April 2014, available at:
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis.
35 Ibid.
36 Matt Sledge, “Every Yemen Drone Strike Creates 40-60 New Enemies, Former US
Official Says,” The Huffington Post, October 23, 2013.
37 Adam Baron, “U.S. Drone Strikes Came Despite Yemen's Hopes to Limit Them,”
McClatchy DC, April 21, 2014, available at:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/04/21/225094/us-drone-strikes-camedespite.html.
34
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Many of the issues in Pakistan are problems in Yemen as well. Yemen also has a
high unemployment rate for their young men and large diasporas communities
with tribal loyalties. Free education is often only provided through madrasas in
many areas of the country. Many madrasas indoctrinate students with antiAmerican messages, and radical Islam teachings. Villages lack basic amenities
such as clean water and electricity, and most do not have trades to sustain an
economy. The villages operate under local village leaders and the central
government does not hold much power in tribal areas. In both countries,
programs that give people the opportunities to be self-sustaining and avoid
turning to resources provided by insurgent groups should supplement the drone
program. By helping the locals build schools, infrastructure, social services, and
economies, the U.S., Pakistani, and Yemeni governments can win gratitude and
provide alternatives. The education institutions should be available for any boy or
girl, and promote critical thinking, pro-democratic, and well-rounded
curriculums including trade skills to build local economic sustainability and
employment.
While the drone programs in Libya and Somalia are younger than the programs
in Yemen and Pakistan, they are built on the same eliminate-but-not-support
policy as their predecessors. Because Somalia and Libya share many of the same
general population and social struggles of Pakistan and Yemen, they will
eventually run into the same resistance and issues that are now being seen in
Yemen and Pakistan. This negative sentiment can be stopped before it starts in
Somalia and Libya, if the United States works with governments to invest in
nation-building activities to support drone campaigns.

The Drones Can Work with Multifaceted Support
The drone program in Pakistan (and others in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya) can be
effective in eliminating terrorism if it is one tactic in a larger strategic plan. In
order to balance destruction, death, and radical teachings against the United
States, there has to be investment in education, rebuilding, and powerful
counter-narratives from moderate or public sources. As the Blitzkrieg proved in
London, resistant movements and civilian populations are resilient under
repeated bombings and destruction, so missiles alone will not stop terrorist
organizations. However, the United States has the tools, expertise, and resources,
to ensure that drones are supported by other nation-building operations that will
build goodwill towards America and take steps to eliminate terrorism. A
multifaceted campaign using all of the components discussed here should
succeed in rebuilding the American image in Pakistan by providing people
options for employment, economic sustainability, and a better life other than
joining insurgent organizations. The key supplements to enhance the
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effectiveness of drone programs and create a successful campaign to rebuild
American support are:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Ensuring foreign aid money is distributed to the villages by local or state
officials by working with the Pakistani government
Working within the tribal system’s leaderships to build support of U.S.
initiatives
Distributing verbal and printed materials explaining and supporting U.S.
programs
Leveraging social media and Internet to counter anti-American rhetoric
and repackaging the war propaganda as a secular war instead of a war on
Islam by the United States.
Educating local populations on alternatives and options available to them
that do not include the Taliban, al-Qaida or insurgent paths
Free and public education options for boys and girls to negate radical
teachings in madrasas
Building infrastructure such as water systems, power grids, medical
facilities, roads, energy facilities, etc.

The United States can provide resources to the local and state officials to create a
secure, educated, and economically sustainable programs in Pakistan. The drone
programs should reinforce anti-terrorism efforts by destroying any reorganizing
attempts the insurgent groups make. The insurgents will no longer be able to
provide more attractive alternatives to the population for recruitment purposes.
American sentiment should improve as civilians see the United States and their
government investing in their villages and socio-economic well-being.

Working with Locals and the Pakistani Government
The United States needs to partner with Pakistan’s government and local tribal
governments to ensure aid is used to build education programs, economic
opportunity, and infrastructure that provide alternatives to the Taliban and alQaida’s provisions. The current drone program simply seeks to kill terrorists in
the hopes that the program will eliminate them faster than organizations can
recruit, train, and reorganize individuals in terror plots against the West. It
depends on the Pakistani government’s honesty to independently distribute aid
and initiate nation-building programs to help its own people. Unfortunately,
because there has been no investment by the Pakistani government in the local
population’s education, trade, skills, jobs, economy, or infrastructure, civilians
are forced to turn to the groups who promise it these opportunities. As Robert
Rotberg states, citizens naturally turn towards sectional and community loyalties
in times of insecurity and state weakness because they are their main default
source of economic opportunity and security. They transfer allegiances to clan
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and group leaders, even warlords, when their government fails to produce the
resources they need feel safe and to create economic sustainability.38 In Pakistan,
the Taliban and al-Qaida, which are well-funded by radical oil barons, adversarial
nations, and drug trades, offer payment for martyrs, family welfare plans, schools
(madrasas), employment, a purpose in life, and “security” in an area with no
alternatives.
Until the Pakistani government steps up to build these institutions, or can agree
on a plan to work with the United States to do so, local villagers will continue to
seek refuge and help from the sources they feel empathize with their pain and
burdens. The plans to negate terrorist organizations solely through drone
programs and airstrikes will continue to fail because they do not address the
systemic social problems. The Pakistani government will continue to feel
backlash and pressure from its citizens to cease the programs. Resentment
towards the United States will grow until it is an engrained psychosomatic
symptom that is not easily erased from the minds and hearts of the Pakistani
people.
The drone program can help Pakistan’s government to secure border areas and
territories in conflict to provide civilians with a sense of security needed to begin
rebuilding. The Pakistani government must be pushed to provide the necessary
resources to foster a peaceful environment such as medical facilities, schools and
educational instruction, infrastructure, and fair judicial system to mediate
disputes.39 The United States can hasten this effort by providing expertise to the
Pakistani government, and incentivizing them to appropriately distribute
economic aid in order to receive their coveted military aid. The current system of
freezing economic aid while decreasing military aid does not promote Pakistani
cooperation because it does not give them any additional reason to distribute
economic aid. The U.S. government must develop relationships on the local levels
to ensure money can be properly distributed to civilians.

How Covert Operations with Local Leaders and Propaganda are
Effective
Through covert operations, the United States has a long history of using
multifaceted propaganda and social campaigns in combination with military
efforts to combat its enemies. In 1948, following World War II, the United States
used a significant covert political operation to ensure that the rising communist
party in Italy did not gain the government through elections. The United States
funneled millions of dollars to the Italian Christian Democratic Party and right-

38
39

Rotberg, Robert, When States Fail (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
Ibid.
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wing Socialist parties. They created pro-democratic propaganda to drum up
support and created a massive media campaign to mobilize Italian voters against
Communist-Socialist coalitions. It kept communism out of Europe, ensured
relations between Italy with Presidents Truman and Taft, and opened the door to
stop communist movements in Greece and Turkey. As part two of the plan,
economic aid was given to those countries that resisted communist leanings and
allowed them to participate in American reconstruction efforts. This campaign
shaped Italian, Greek, and to some extent Turkish, views of America.40
In Afghanistan in 2001, the first CIA team (supported by the U.S. military) into
Afghanistan after the September 11th bombings, worked with cultural and
language experts while coordinating military air and fire support. The team
worked with local tribal leaders to instill good will for the Americans, paid for
supplies through the mountains, encouraged education for men and women,
explained the United States’ reasons for being in the country including the
benefits to security and stability to the individual tribal leaders, and negotiated
with the government to create a U.S. support system. They went to remote areas
where traditional boots-on-the-ground military campaigns were not an option,
spoke with people in the villages, and determined the best course of actions while
gathering intelligence and distributing verbal propaganda and monetary aid to
build support. The U.S. men on the ground helped village leaders determine who
the “bad guys” were (al-Qaida and Taliban) and who the “good guys” were (the
United States, United Kingdom, NATO troops, certain Afghanistan tribal
leaders). The U.S. operatives helped villagers identify leaders in their
communities and created tribal round tables that centralized power in the region.
They also monitored the progress of social programs and ensured funds were
spent on approved items. This campaign worked effectively for the first eighteen
months that the United States was in Afghanistan.41 These are just two examples
of how the United States has successfully run covert campaigns that could be
used as complementary programs to strengthen the success of the drone
programs. The United States has the resources to implement a strategy
combining propaganda campaigns to educate Pakistanis about the drone
campaign targeting with a cohesive plan to build relationships with local leaders
while helping the Pakistani government centralize power in diaspora
communities and implementing socio-economic development.
Although it must be careful that it does not appear to manipulate the government
processes or circumvent the Pakistani government, the United States should use
a covert propaganda campaigns to explain specifically whom they are targeting
40 Miller, James E., Taking Off the Gloves: The and the Italian Elections of 1948 (San
Diego: University of California San Diego, 2007), 35-56.
41 Schroen, Gary, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on
Terror In Afghanistan (New York, NY: Ballantine, 2005).
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and build relationships with local populations to gain their trust. As Brookings
Institute analyst, Madiha Afzal states, “Militancy in Pakistan is essentially a war
of ideas and narratives and it’s completely naïve to think you can ‘buy’ your way
out of it through economic growth. What needs tackling is the radical
narrative.”42
The United States does not need to share individual names, nor give away specific
operational plans but it should explain to local communities who the groups are,
why they are a threat to the local and world populations, and why the drone
programs are the best options to stop them through common propaganda
mediums (such as fliers, matchbooks, internet, newspapers etc.). By explaining
whom these groups are, the United States provides a sense of security to the
general population because the people understand they will not be targeted if
they do not commit certain actions and therefore should be safe. Currently, the
local populations fear the drones, in part, because the targets do not make sense
and they ban together to protect themselves, create mini-militias, or work with
the groups that the drones are targeting. This unintentionally makes them
targets.
The United States has to work with the local and state governments to help
promote the drone operations. This is in part because the United States needs a
supply of information and materials to conduct their missions accurately. The
local tribesmen and leaders hold control on the territories, access roads, and
infrastructure, and influence on their populations. They also generally know the
families in their areas and can spot growing unrest or threats much faster than
the United States can from the air. The United States also needs their support to
reduce fear, resentment, and aggression towards the drone program as leaders of
their communities. The United States will have to risk the lives of a few plainclothed men on the ground in order to build effective relationships with these
leaders but do not have to commit large military ground-troops to accomplish
this goal. Without local tribal leaders, no drone program will never be a success
because the local leaders will work against the program.
In countries like Afghanistan, the United States gave the money directly to
individual tribal leaders to use it in their areas as they saw fit.43 Sometimes this
led to corruption or embezzlement but much of the time these leaders would help
their communities with it. The United States can tackle nation development

Madiha Afzal, "Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif: Six Month On, No Vision,"
Brookings Institute, December 11, 2013, available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/11-nawaz-sharif-pakistanafzal.
43 Schroen, Gary, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on
Terror In Afghanistan (New York, NY: Ballantine, 2005).
42
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projects by combining both strategies. They can work from the top Pakistani
authorities down but they can also build relationships on local levels and work
from the bottom up. A large strategic plan must be created to unify both efforts
and the United States will have to balance covert operations to influence local
level efforts with national policy endeavors. If the Pakistani government will
commit to improving living conditions through socio-economic development, the
relationships the United States builds through the programs could help the
Pakistani government regain control of the conflict territories and build diverse
coalitions that will work with the government to tackle security concerns and
development strategies in their regions.

Changing the Dialogue-Media and Messaging
An additional challenge for the drone program is the speed at which information
travels in the digital age of flash media, instantaneous news, and easily accessible
Internet. Anti-American sentiment will only continue to spread to all corners of
the globe because negative sentiments spread more rapidly44. American foreign
policy or military actions towards Islamic-Arab states continues to fuel antiAmerican sentiment throughout much of the Islamic world. Examples of these
actions are the full support for the State of Israel, Operation Dessert Storm,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, invasion of Afghanistan, and the treatment of the
Koran in military detention facilities. Muslim leaders have claimed the drone
campaigns are another example of Christian expansion and anti-Islamic policies.
Many Muslims, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, feel their land, resources, culture, and
religion are under attack by Christian-Western nation states. American policy
provides radical Islamic organizations the material to persuade local,
uneducated, populations of this attack against them. With few or no alternative
narratives to counter it, this perception becomes the reality. To this unsupported
population, drones are just another step to by America to eradicate Islam, Arab
culture, and their families. The individuals who are targeted by the U.S. drones
are not terrorist to Pakistan’s populations; rather they are beloved relatives
fighting to defend their cultural or religious beliefs that they feel are under attack.
To the Pakistani civilians, their loved ones who fight against the U.S. drones and
attacks are no different than the U.S. soldier who signs up to serve to defend the
United States.
To counter the common belief that the drone program is a war on religious
culture, practices, and ethnic beliefs, the United States needs a counter message
of war for domestic security—not as a policy against radical Islam—but as a policy
against any attacks on their citizens by any country or individual, foreign or
domestic regardless of religion. This message has been grossly marginalized as
“Twitter Program 'Maps Nation's Mood,” BBC, September 7, 2013, available at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24001692.

44

74
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss4/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.4.5

Hall: Help Wanted: American Drone Program

sensational reporting and more radical politicians voice their strategies for a
Judeo-Christian war on Islam. The South Asian Americans Leading Together
released a report claiming from 2011 to 2014, there were 160 reports of
xenophobic political rhetoric directed against Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Middle
Eastern, Arab, and South Asian communities by U.S. political leaders. Ninety
percent were motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment.45 When the U.S.
representatives use terms such as “fight with jihadists” as used by The Wall Street
Journal or Michelle Bachmann’s “War on Islam” describing Islamic
fundamentalists as barbaric, and calling this a “spiritual warfare,” they pigeon
hole the United States into the religious war messaging that the terrorists are
using to recruit members of the Islamic community.46 To rebrand this message
the United States has to implement a solid propaganda and media campaign that
is consistently secular in language to change the messaging one delivery channel
at a time. Any Administration official must uphold American values of fairness
and equality, and strongly condemn hateful rhetoric by other political figures.
Whether its through the education system, social media, television, radio,
political propaganda, or print, official representatives of the United States must
adjust their language to a security position and not a war on religion to diminish
the recruitment messaging of the Muslim insurgents.
The Pakistani Muslim population already believes that they are under attack for
their religion because of this common messaging. Throughout history, aggression
toward cultural identity and religion has always caused populations to grow
defensive and fearful for their way of life. In response, many cultures arm
themselves, which causes their neighbors to increase their arms in defense and
each country continues to heighten their defenses in response to the other until
logical defense becomes completely illogical and causes conflict.47 In a sense, the
message of war on Islam has caused Pakistanis to go on the defense; the U.S.
drone program only heightens this sense of impending attack because civilians
see the United States monitoring their views and killing their loved ones in
strikes; drones cause them to further seek defenses by aiding insurgent groups
such as al-Qaida and the Taliban who say they will take on the United States and
Sameera Hafiz, Suman Raghunathan, Deepa Iyer, and Victoria Meaney, "Under
Suspicion, Under Attack: Xenophobic Political Rhetoric and Hate Violence against South
Asian, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Middle Eastern and Arab Communities in the United
States," South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT) (2014).
46 Jeffrey Sparshott, "In Shift, U.S. Calls Fight With Jihadists 'War'," Wall Street Journal,
September 12, 2014, available at: http://online.wsj.com/articles/kerry-urges-turkey-tojoin-fight-against-jihadists-1410543450;
Lauretta Brown, "Bachmann: 'We Need to Declare War on Islamic Jihad'," CNS News,
September 26, 2014, available at: http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/laurettabrown/bachmann-we-need-declare-war-islamic-jihad.
47 Nelson Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemas, and Violent Predation: Causes of
Failure," in Robert Rotberg, When States Fail (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2010), 53-64.
45
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stop the drones in defense of their religion. If the United States can change its
messaging to deescalate the message of war on cultural and religious identity, it
should lessen some, but not all, of the tension as Pakistanis realize the drones are
a fight against those individuals who (plan to) attack the United States and not
against Islam.
The United States should deliberately leverage the propaganda machine created
by the Internet to spread its mission as well. In order to spread a pro-American
message and overtake the negative messages, the United States must use it even
more effectively and intentionally than others who take it to express their
dissatisfaction. It has been proven that angry sentiment spreads faster than other
emotion on the Internet and it can be used to reach and motivate thousands of
people in the shortest amount of time in history.48 Even in the remotest villages
of Pakistan, people rely on the Internet to speak with loved ones, follow the news,
and organize their daily lives. America must look at the Internet as investment
opportunity, and leverage it to counteract the negative sentiment posted every
day. It can respond to posts of outrage, exploit positive statistics, discredit the
organizations using it, explain benefits of programs, and promote open dialogue
with productive counter-terrorism messaging through social and print media. If
done in a timely fashion, the Internet also allows the United States to post its
version of events for the public to weigh in their consideration. Too often,
individuals on the ground or the terrorist themselves post pictures of drone
destruction with their version of the situation and the United States is slow to
respond with a defense—if they do at all.49 If the United States posted its story
before the insurgents portray it as an attack on Islam or civilians than it may
reduce some fear and chaos against which the general population is rebelling.

Education
Education is an incredibly important way to spread positive messaging and
rebuild countries. The United States needs to encourage free-schools for boys and
girls in Pakistan. Pakistan’s Constitution entrusts the Federal Government with
the responsibility for policy planning, and promotion of educational facilities in
the federated territories. It also recognizes that education is a basic right of every
citizen and crucial for economic development and poverty alleviation. The
Federal Ministry of Education administers the public education system but
divisions of district responsibilities decentralized the power of the programs.
Reforms to abolish the British education system to educate only the elite have
failed because of the weak management and supervision structure, shortage of

48
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educators and physical facilities, and extremely low funding.50 Generally,
Pakistan’s expenditure on education is less than two percent of the gross
domestic product—about $2 million.51 This is insignificant money for a country of
over 180 million people.52 The literacy rate in Pakistan is estimated to be around
fifty percent for men, and thirty-eight percent for females; the gender-based
discrepancy in education levels has contributed to the persistence of illiteracy and
underdevelopment of Pakistan because women in the communities would
generally lead education for young children in these communities; but they
cannot pass on the knowledge they do not possess. Impoverished families taking
young children out of school to work to provide household income also
compounds the literacy population. Approximately half of the student population
drops out before completing primary education and it is estimated more than
four million children from ages five to nine years old never attend school. Rural
communities have seen a huge decline in public school enrollment in rural
communities since 1998. This is largely because public education systems have
not been established or sustained in rural communities and even urban areas
have seen huge privatization efforts in education systems. This privatization
eliminates the impoverished populations’ access to education.53
The Taliban and al-Qaida have quickly capitalized on this need for education and
vacuum created by privatization and disorganization by creating madrasas.
Madrasas are schools that teach reading and religious history based on the
Koran. They are almost-always for boys only, and nearly-always radical in their
fundamental religious teaching. They are a pervasive influence on the antiAmerican sentiment in rural Pakistani communities. Their curriculum is
generally rote memorization and does not include skills to pursue trade or
business. The madrasas have proved to be fertile recruitment grounds for
terrorist organizations. In 2009, ninety-percent of suicide bombers in Pakistan
were between the ages of sixteen to eighteen years old. Taliban commander Qari
Hussein, boasts about recruiting children as young as five or six years old
50 Umbreen Sabir, "Pakistan and Its Education System," Technische Universitat
Munchen, 2008, available at: http://wwwdb.in.tum.de/teaching/ws1112/hsufg/Taxila/Site/education.html.
51 Comparatively, Pakistan’s government announced $6.8 million budget for military
spending in 2014; Ismail Sheikh, and Kamran Yousaf, "Budget 2014: Govt announces
700bn defence budget," International New York Times Tribune, June 03, 2014, available
at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/716913/budget-2014-defence-budget-increasing-atdiminishing-rate/.
52 This is despite repeated commitments by governments to reach the UNESCO target of 4
percent of GDP. Regional neighbor China invests more than $117 billion in education, and
India more than $44 billion;
Kate Pennington, "Republicans Debate How Much to Cut Education while China and
India Invest More," Think Progress, August 29, 2012, available at:
http://thinkprogress.org/education/2012/08/29/757661/republican-education-chinaindia/.
53 Sabir, Pakistan and Its Education System 2008
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through the madrasas to become suicide bombers and help the jihad. Many of
these schools promote anti-American sentiment and that Islam is under attack by
the United States. They claim the only way to stop the U.S. drone program is
through guerilla tactics, violent resistance, and jihad.54
Providing alternatives to the madrasas, and education for women, are critical
issues in most developing Arab countries. Educating women and girls, has proven
to build sustainable economies in Africa, India, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, where
women are traditionally excluded from education because of religious or cultural
beliefs. Including them in education is a huge component to a successful, secure
state because women can contribute to household incomes and economic
sustainability.55 Providing free-schooling in rural communities for boys and girls,
and working with community leaders to encourage education for their children
are two huge components to minimize terrorist influence on areas. Through
schools and education the United States has the ability to teach information that
will promote democracy, equal rights, tolerance, and critical-thinking by
providing students with global perspectives, secular history, and alternative
resources for information. In free, secular schools, critical-thinking can be taught
through science, math, and reading courses that encourage more than rote
memorization. Education is the best way to shape the youth of an area, reshape
engrained beliefs by promoting positive dialogue and discussion about different
governmental and cultural systems, and discourage youth from joining extremist
groups. It provides students with training and skills necessary to build trade and
manage businesses in their village and allows them to consider work beyond that
provided by militias and radical extremist groups.
The United States has the experience to help Pakistan educate teachers and build
facilities in these underserved communities. More importantly, the United States
can make its military aid to Pakistan contingent upon implementing measures to
strengthen its public education system and distributing U.S. economic and
development aid for these programs. Development aid must extend to build basic
amenities such as electric power and fresh water systems. Energy shortages are
common to Pakistan and create political unrest that in turns reduces the
government's ability to provide security and stability to the country; this sense of
security is crucial to persuade the establishment of permanent communities as an
alternative to organization of insurgent communities.

Kalsoom Lakhani, “Indoctrinating Children; The Making of Pakistan's Suicide
Bombers,” Counter Terrorism Center, June 03, 2010, available at:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/indoctrinating-children-the-making-ofpakistan%E2%80%99s-suicide-bombers.
55 Kathy Matsui, “The Economic Benefits of Educating Women,” Bloomberg Media,
March 07, 2013, available at: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/theeconomic-benefits-of-educating-women.
54
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The United States proved in Italy and Afghanistan (albeit only the initial surge),
that it can effectively leverage media and propaganda, create education and social
programs, and work with local leaders to stop anti-American groups (such as
communists and insurgents) in their tracks. To be successful again, the U.S.
government has to think offensively, constructively, and creatively to build a
long-term, multifaceted policy that ensures America does not have to fight a
cyclical cycle of unrest because it did not make proper investments in the first
place.

Conclusion
The current U.S. drone program in Pakistan addresses a very singular goal: kill
terrorists before they can recruit, regenerate, and harm the United States. This
program stands alone without nation-building efforts, strategies to build local
support, education programs, or even support by Pakistan to distribute
nonmilitary U.S. aid. These additional support efforts are necessary to create a
multifaceted strategic plan that comprehensively attacks terrorists’ ability to
organize and function.
The United States should be prepared for the reality that unless the Pakistani
government will do its part to create this infrastructure, its aid programs at the
local level will be weakened in their ability to curb terrorism. Unfortunately, the
United States cannot simply walk away from the entire situation because
Pakistan provides access to supply U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and has provided
safe harbor for terrorists in the past. Without the cooperation of Pakistan’s
government to take actions aimed at preventing safe harbor for terrorists and
maintaining control of their territories, it is likely terrorists will be able to
reorganize in the FATA territories and in urban areas. Therefore, the United
States needs to begin investing in these programs with or without full support of
Pakistan’s government. Without these systems, Pakistanis will continue to turn
towards organizations willing to help them establish security, basic amenities,
and sustainable economies in which to live. Pakistan must deliver basic services
to promote security, education, and economic prosperity to strengthen their state
and reduce the number of civilians turning to insurgent groups for protection,
income, and services. The United States must be ready for the opportunity to help
Pakistan’s government deliver this as soon as it is able.
The United States has a long history of being effective in combat zones because it
is able to gain the hearts and minds of the locals, while fighting the enemy. The
drone program brings the fight, but building socio-economic structures through
education, propaganda, aid, and local relationships builds the trust of the
communities and wins them to the United States’ cause. The drone programs do
deter individuals to work with insurgents and terrorists because it creates fear
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and a consequence to actions. However, the problem is that fear alone will not
stop terrorist actions without a substantial balance of positive investment. Socioeconomic investment creates alternatives to Taliban and al-Qaida programs that
currently fill these voids. While building support campaigns around the drone
program to help the Pakistani government address systemic issues, the United
States should continue leveraging the drone campaign to disrupt terrorist groups’
organization and communication. This provides a balance of soft power to
support communities with the hard power of the drone attacks. The investment
by the United States to rebuild and revitalize the Pakistani state should
eventually reduce anti-American hostility and reduce the appeal of terrorist
organizations to the Pakistanis. The drone program is not completely hopeless; it
just needs a support by a multifaceted, long-term strategy to be truly effective at
stopping terrorism and reducing hostility towards the United States.

80
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss4/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.4.5

